AWSLang: Probabilistic Threat Modelling of the Amazon Web Services environment

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Introduction

- Attack simulations provide a viable means to test the cyber security of a system.
- One common approach to implement such simulations is the use of attack graph, which trace the various dependencies of every step and their connection to one another in a formal way.
- To further facilitate attack simulations and to reduce the effort of creating new attack graphs for each system of a given type, domain-specific languages are employed.
- This thesis report presents **AWSLang**, which can be used to design IT system models in context to the AWS (Amazon Web Services) environment and analyse their weaknesses.

Background

- **Threat modelling** involves understanding the complexity of the system and identifying all possible threats to the system, regardless of whether they can be exploited or not.
- Threat modelling looks at the system from an adversary's perspective to help designers anticipate attack goals and determine answers to questions about *what* the system is designed to protect, and from *whom*.
- Employing **attack graphs** during the threat modelling procedure offers a lot more advantages than other available methods to model a system.
- Generally, the production and analysis of attack graphs employ three steps: modelling the system; using **attack steps** to build a connected graph; analysis of the newly-constructed graph.


Background

- To facilitate threat modelling especially with respect to the construction of attack graphs and their analysis, **probabilistic relational model** has been proposed.
- It specifies how a graphical representation of probabilistic dependencies between variables should be constructed from a model that instantiates a class diagram (metamodel), such as the one of UML (Unified Modelling Language).
- Effectively, probabilistic relational threat modelling makes use of **Bayesian networks** to allow for attack simulations.
- With a system architecture model (metamodel) as the foundations, **attack simulations** allow for the execution of numerous parallel virtual penetration tests.

- Proposed by Johnson et al, MAL is a meta language and not a domain-specific language that facilitates attack simulations by defining what information is needed to model a particular system and specifying the generic attack logic.
- Classes containing attack steps constitute the core entities of a MAL specification. For example, Cloud can be an entity in a MAL specification, initialized as cloud.
- Furthermore, the entities of MAL are related to each other. For example, the class Cloud can be associated with class CloudServices (initialized as services) to refer to the services offered by the cloud.
- Attack steps are connected to each other, and thus a successful compromise of one step leads to the second step.







• MAL features inheritance in a manner comparable to other object-oriented languages.

• Some steps may be accomplished without effort. However, for to compromise some entity there is a fixed amount of time required.

For example, if the time to crack the access key of the virtual machine takes a mean of 12 hours and a standard deviation of 5 hours, it be specified by a Gamma distribution as follows:

```
asset VirtualMachine {
```

& crackAccessKey [GammaDistribution(24, 0.5)]

Amazon Web Services (AWS)

- Like most cloud service providers, AWS provides on-demand cloud computing platform and utilities to individuals and enterprises (both in the private and public sector), on a paid subscription basis.
- The AWS Cloud Infrastructure is spread over many geographical regions. In AWS terminology, these are called Regions and Availability Zones (AZs).
- AWS provides services in 19 (and expanding) categories, ranging from dynamic compute capacity to storage to virtual networks, etc.



Compute

Amazon EC2

Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling

Amazon Elastic Container Service

Amazon Elastic Container Service for Kubernetes

- Amazon Elastic Container Registry
- Amazon Lightsail
- AWS Batch
- AWS Elastic Beanstalk
- AWS Fargate
- AWS Lambda
- AWS Serverless Application Repository
- Elastic Load Balancing
- VMware Cloud on AWS

Storage

Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) Amazon Elastic File System (EFS) Amazon Glacier AWS Storage Gateway AWS Snowball AWS Snowball Edge AWS Snowmobile

Database

Amazon Aurora Amazon RDS Amazon DynamoDB Amazon ElastiCache Amazon Redshift Amazon Neptune AWS Database Migration Service

Software

AWS Marketplace

Migration

AWS Migration Hub AWS Application Discovery Service AWS Database Migration Service AWS Server Migration Service AWS Snowball AWS Snowball Edge AWS Snowmobile

Networking & Content Delivery

Amazon VPC Amazon VPC PrivateLink Amazon CloudFront Amazon Route 53 Amazon API Gateway AWS Direct Connect Elastic Load Balancing

Developer Tools

AWS CodeStar AWS CodeCommit AWS CodeBuild AWS CodeDeploy AWS CodePipeline AWS Cloud9 AWS X-Ray AWS Tools & SDKs

Media Services

Amazon Elastic Transcoder Amazon Kinesis Video Streams AWS Elemental MediaConvert AWS Elemental MediaLive AWS Elemental MediaPackage AWS Elemental MediaStore AWS Elemental MediaTailor

Management Tools

Amazon CloudWatch AWS Auto Scaling AWS CloudFormation AWS CloudTrail AWS Config AWS OpsWorks AWS Service Catalog AWS Systems Manager AWS Trusted Advisor AWS Personal Health Dashboard AWS Command Line Interface AWS Management Console AWS Managed Services

Machine Learning

Amazon SageMaker Amazon Comprehend Amazon Lex Amazon Polly Amazon Rekognition Amazon Rekognition Amazon Translate Amazon Translate AWS DeepLens AWS DeepLearning AMIs Apache MXNet on AWS TensorFlow on AWS

AWS Cost Management

AWS Cost Explorer AWS Budgets Reserved Instance Reporting AWS Cost and Usage Report

Analytics

Amazon Athena Amazon EMR Amazon CloudSearch Amazon Elasticsearch Service Amazon Kinesis Amazon Redshift Amazon QuickSight AWS Data Pipeline AWS Glue

Security, Identity & Compliance

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) Amazon Cloud Directory Amazon Cognito Amazon GuardDuty Amazon Inspector Amazon Macie AWS Certificate Manager AWS CloudHSM AWS Directory Service AWS Firewall Manager AWS Key Management Service AWS Organizations AWS Secrets Manager AWS Single Sign-On AWS Shield AWS WAF AWS Artifact

Mobile Services

AWS Mobile Hub Amazon API Gateway Amazon Pinpoint AWS AppSync AWS Device Farm AWS Mobile SDK

AR & VR

Amazon Sumerian

Application Integration

Amazon MQ Amazon Simple Queue Service (SQS) Amazon Simple Notification Service (SNS) AWS AppSync AWS Step Functions

Customer Engagement

Amazon Connect Amazon Pinpoint Amazon Simple Email Service (SES)

Business Productivity

Alexa for Business Amazon Chime Amazon WorkDocs Amazon WorkMail

Desktop & App Streaming

Amazon WorkSpaces Amazon AppStream 2.0

Internet of Things

AWS IOT Core Amazon FreeRTOS AWS Greengrass AWS IOT 1-Click AWS IOT Analytics AWS IOT Button AWS IOT Device Defender AWS IOT Device Management

Game Development

Amazon GameLift Amazon Lumberyard

Scope and Delimitations of the project



Methodology


Using the Design Science Research Process Model (DSR Cycle) to provide the overall structure to the project, the following objectives were identified:

Perform a Domain Survey

A Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of the AWS domain was conducted.

Construct a Feature Matrix

It maps the elements, or "assets," in coreLang with the assets in AWSLang.




Methodology

Build a MAL specification

AWSLang was written using simple text editors, such as the Notepad++ tool, using prevalent Java syntax; and complied via a custom compiler based off the ANTLR framework.

Write Test cases

Written in Java using the Eclipse editor, two categories of test cases were written: Unit tests, and Use Case tests.




Domain Survey: Amazon EC2

- Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud provides scalable computing capacity in the Amazon Web Services cloud.
- The virtual computing environments offered by the EC2 service are called as *instances*.
- These instances are grounded on various configuration of CPU, memory, storage, and networking capacity for the instances, known as the *instance types*.
- While the instance type essentially determines the hardware of the host computer, the *Amazon Machine Image (AMI)* is a template that contains the software configuration (such as an **operating system**, an application server, and other **applications**) for the instance.



Domain Survey: Amazon S3

- Amazon Simple Storage Service is an object storage service designed to offer high availability and fast retrieval at high speed for any amount of data.
- Data in Amazon S3 is stored as *objects* within *buckets*.
- The *object key* uniquely identifies the object in the bucket. In most cases, the file names act as the object keys.
- Object metadata is a set of name-value pairs that need to be set at the time the object is uploaded into the bucket.
- Amazon S3 supports *subresources* to store and manage the bucket configuration information using the Amazon S3 API or via the web console.



Domain Survey: Amazon VPC

- Amazon Virtual Private Cloud enables subscribers to launch AWS resources into a virtual network that they have defined.
- Within each VPC, subscribers can create, connect, and launch individual *subnets*.
- Each subnet must be associated with a *route table*, which specifies the allowed routes for outbound traffic and inbound traffic for the subnet.
- **Security groups** control inbound and outbound traffic for the resource within the VPC.



Domain Survey: Amazon IAM

- The AWS Identity and Access Management is a service offered by AWS to securely control access to the resource within its cloud environment.
- An *IAM user* is a unique identity recognized by AWS services and applications.
- An *IAM group* is a collection of IAM users. It lets subscribers specify permissions for multiple users, which can make it easier to manage the permissions for those users.
- An *IAM role* is an IAM entity that defines a set of permissions for making AWS service requests. IAM roles are not associated with a specific user or group. Instead, trusted entities assume roles.




coreLang

- The core language on which AWSLang is based on mainly consists of standard IT entities useful for representing traditional networks and similar models.
- The major elements of coreLang are Machine, Account, Vulnerability, Network, Data, Dataflow, and User.
- Each User has an Account on a Machine that they use to request Data stored on it. Machines communicate to each other via Dataflows over a Network.
- Some of the other elements in coreLang are: AuthMachine, VulnMachine, SoftMachine, Software, Product, Service, Client, AuthenticationService, NetworkService, NetworkClient, Router, Information, AuthData, CoreEncryptedData, CryptographicKey, etc.

Feature Matrix


- The main advantage of constructing such a feature matrix is that it prevents repetition of work.
- There are assets in AWSLang that have been adapted off coreLang, albeit with a name change. This is different from the "Adopted from coreLang with modifications" column in the Feature Matrix. That column is used to identify only those assets from coreLang whose internal logic needed to be modified for use in AWSLang.

Assets in AWSLang	Adapted from coreLang without change	Adopted from coreLang with modifications	Not used in coreLang / New asset created for AWSLang
AccessKey			x
Account		x	
Application		x	
AuthenticationService	X		
Bucket			x
Client	X		
Credentials	x		
CryptographicKey	X		
Data	x		
Dataflow		х	
EncryptedData	x		
EncryptionService		х	
Gateway		x	
Group			x
IAMaccount			x
Information	x		
Instance			x
Key	x		
Machine	x		
Network		х	
NetworkClient	x		
NetworkService	X		
OperatingSystem		x	
Role			x
SecurityGroup			x
Service	X		
Software	x		
User	X		
Vulnerability	x		



MAL specification

AWSLang extends the core by introducing elements such as IAMaccount, Role, Group, etc., that are needed in order to model the AWS environment.



asset Instance extends Machine

keyaccess

:

- -> attemptConnectBasicAWSProtection, attemptConnectAdvancedAWSProtection
- & attemptConnectBasicAWSProtection
 - -> authenticate
 - attemptConnectAdvancedAWSProtection [ExponentialDistribution(6.0)]
 - -> authenticate
- # advancedAWSProtection
 - -> attemptConnectBasicAWSProtection

```
asset AccessKey extends Key {

    modifyKeyFile
        -> __compromise
    & _compromise [ExponentialDistribution(6.0)]
        -> compromise
        l compromise
        l compromise
            -> assignedInstances.keyaccess,
            assignedOSaccount.authenticate
```

asset Bucket extends Machine {

- attemptConnectPublicBucket
 - -> bruteForceAttack
- & bruteForceAttack [ExponentialDistribution(3.0)]
 - -> data.requestAccess
- # privateBucket
 - -> bruteForceAttack

asset Application extends Software {

access

•

- -> attemptAccessNoFirewall, attemptAccessWithFirewall
- & attemptAccessNoFirewall
 - -> _machineAccess
- attemptAccessWithFirewall [ExponentialDistribution(3.0)]
 - -> _machineAccess
- # firewallProtection
 - -> attemptAccessNoFirewall

Evaluation

• For validating AWSLang, two different categories of testing were applied:

Unit tests, to ensure that each individual asset in AWSLang behaves like it is expected to.

Use case tests, that rely on the compiled attack list and validate that assets in AWSLang interact with each as they are expected to.


 Additionally, AWSLang was cross checked by two developers, each of whom are also working on a realization of MAL and is therefore familiar with the intricacies of the language. Furthermore, this also helped uncover any readability or user-friendliness issues due to the lack of documentation that the language might suffer from.

Unit tests sample: IAMaccountTest

```
Attacker attacker = new Attacker();
attacker.addAttackPoint(iamacct.compromise);
attacker.attack();
```

iamacct.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); instance.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); instance.denialOfService.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); bucket.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); bucket.access.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); group.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); role.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); network.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); gateway.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously(); secGrp.compromisedAccess.assertCompromisedInstantaneously();

Use case tests sample: TestUseCaseRoles_Instances



Conclusion and Future Work

- The exponential growth in the usage of cloud service providers and the increasing reliance of ITsystems to their ubiquitous nature in addition to the capability that they provide make it paramount to assess their security, especially as these security and privacy concerns continue to grow.
- AWSLang will foster security analysts in the AWS cloud domain to model their cloud systems and to focus on analysing possible weaknesses.
- Although AWSLang is its current form is able to model the most-widely used AWS services and their interaction, further work remains.

Thank you!